Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion

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dc.contributor.authorDe Haas, Samuelen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorPaha, Johannesen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-18T06:58:14Z
dc.date.available2023-01-18T06:58:14Z
dc.date.issued2020-05
dc.descriptionCITATION: De Haas, S. & Paha, J. 2020. Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion. Review of Industrial Organization, 58:431–454, doi:10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y.
dc.descriptionThe original publication is available at https://link.springer.com
dc.description.abstractThis article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.en_ZA
dc.description.urihttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y
dc.description.versionPublisher's version
dc.format.extent24 pages
dc.identifier.citationDe Haas, S. & Paha, J. 2020. Non-controlling minority shareholdings and collusion. Review of Industrial Organization, 58:431–454, doi:10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y.
dc.identifier.issn573-7160 (online)
dc.identifier.issn0889-938X (print)
dc.identifier.otherdoi:10.1007/s11151-020-09758-y
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/126223
dc.language.isoen_ZAen_ZA
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.rights.holderAuthors retain copyright
dc.subjectMinority stockholdersen_ZA
dc.subjectCompetition -- Economic aspectsen_ZA
dc.subjectConsolidation and merger of corporationsen_ZA
dc.titleNon-controlling minority shareholdings and collusionen_ZA
dc.typeArticleen_ZA
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