Re-evaluating the Constitutional Court’s approach to deprivation of property since the FNB decision
| dc.contributor.advisor | Slade, Bradley V. | en_ZA |
| dc.contributor.author | Sono, Nhlanhla Lucky | en_ZA |
| dc.contributor.other | Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Law. Dept. of Public Law. | en_ZA |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-13T09:43:30Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-01T07:55:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-11-13T09:43:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-02-01T07:55:15Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-12 | |
| dc.description | Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2020. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.abstract | ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation re-evaluates the Constitutional Court’s approach to deprivation of property since the seminal decision in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (FNB), with a particular focus on the Court’s constitutional interpretive framework, the FNB questions and the FNB methodology. Whether the Constitutional Court’s approach, beginning with FNB and advanced in subsequent cases, has established any clarity regarding the Court’s constitutional interpretive framework, the FNB questions and the methodology is further investigated. Core concepts emanating from the FNB questions such as the meaning of “property” and “deprivation”, as well as specific issues regarding the requirements for a valid deprivation, such as law of general application and the substantive arbitrariness test are analysed. The dissertation further focuses on the inconsistencies and the fact that there is a lack of clarity regarding the position of the Court on core concepts. These core concepts include the meaning of “property”, “deprivation”, and the application of the requirements for a valid deprivation such as law of general application and the substantive arbitrariness test. The dissertation also shows that there are inconsistencies and a lack of clarity regarding how the Court’s constitutional interpretive framework is relied upon to decide the FNB questions. Moreover, the methodology that was established by the Court in FNB to resolve constitutional property disputes is not strictly adhered to and in some cases, seems to have resulted in a vortex effect. It is revealed in this dissertation that the Court’s lack of clarity and consistency in its approach regarding the issues above, complicates the section 25(1) inquiry and makes future case law on section 25(1) disputes unpredictable. Therefore, the dissertation analyses and evaluates the developments in post-FNB case law in light of scholarly work and theoretical frameworks and concludes by making recommendations for the adjudication of section 25(1) disputes that will arguably make the outcome predictable. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.abstract | AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif herevalueer die Konstitusionele Hof se benadering tot die ontneming van eiendom sedert die beslissende uitspraak in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (“FNB”), met ‘n spesifieke fokus op die hof se grondwetlike interpretatiewe raamwerk, die FNB-vrae en die FNB-metodologie. Of die Konstitusionele Hof se benadering, wat begin het met FNB en in daaropvolgende sake uitgebrei is, tot enige duidelikheid ten opsigte van die hof se grondwetlike interpretatiewe raamwerk, die FNB-vrae en die metodologie gelei het, word verder ondersoek. Kernbegrippe wat voortspruit uit die FNB-vrae, soos die betekenis van “eiendom” en “ontneming”, asook spesifieke kwessies rakende die vereistes vir ‘n geldige ontneming, soos algemeen geldende reg en die toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming, word verder ontleed. Die proefskrif fokus verder ook op die teenstrydighede en die feit dat daar ‘n gebrek aan duidelikheid rakende die hof se standpunt oor kernbegrippe bestaan. Hierdie kernbegrippe sluit die betekenis van “eiendom” en “ontneming” asook die toepassing van die vereistes vir 'n geldige ontneming, soos algemeen geldende reg en die toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre ontneming, in. Die proefskrif dui ook verder aan dat daar teenstrydighede en ‘n gebrek aan duidelikheid rakende hoe daar op die hof se grondwetlike interpretatiewe raamwerk gesteun moet word om die FNB-vrae te beslis, bestaan. Daarbenewens word die metode wat deur die hof in FNB ingestel is om geskille oor grondwetlike eiendom te besleg, nie streng nagekom nie, en blyk dit in sommige gevalle om 'n draaikolk-effek te hê. Dit word in hierdie proefskrif bloot gelê dat die gebrek aan duidelikheid en konsekwentheid van die hof in sy benadering tot die kwessies hierbo, die ondersoek van artikel 25(1) bemoeilik en toekomstige regspraak wat oor artikel 25(1)-geskille handel, onvoorspelbaar maak. Die proefskrif ontleed en evalueer dus ook die ontwikkelinge in post-FNB regspraak in die lig van akademiese werke asook teoretiese raamwerke en sluit af deur aanbevelings vir die beoordeling van artikel 25(1) geskille, wat waarskynlik die uitslag voorspelbaar sal maak, te maak. | af_ZA |
| dc.description.version | Doctoral | en_ZA |
| dc.format.extent | 301 pages | en_ZA |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/109440 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_ZA | en_ZA |
| dc.publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University | en_ZA |
| dc.rights.holder | Stellenbosch University | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Deprivation of property | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | First National Bank case law | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | Arbitrariness test | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | South Africa. Constitutional Court -- Cases | en_ZA |
| dc.subject | UCTD | en_ZA |
| dc.title | Re-evaluating the Constitutional Court’s approach to deprivation of property since the FNB decision | en_ZA |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_ZA |