Simulated horizontal mergers in vertically related markets

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dc.contributor.advisorBoshoff, Willemen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorMarais, Wihanen_ZA
dc.contributor.otherStellenbosch University. Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. Dept. of Economics.en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-22T09:12:46Z
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-29T09:22:54Z
dc.date.available2022-02-22T09:12:46Z
dc.date.available2022-04-29T09:22:54Z
dc.date.issued2022-04
dc.descriptionThesis (MCom)--Stellenbosch University, 2022.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractENGLISH SUMMARY: A global trend of increasing retail concentration and a heightened concern about buyer power demand more sophisticated and flexible merger screening tools. Parametrisable merger simulation models that suitably account for the effects of bargaining competition may pose a solution. Thus, this dissertation examines the predicted effects o f retail consolidation in a vertically related market using the merger simulation tool developed by Tschantz and Froeb (2019). With the flat logit nested demand function for differentiated products of Boshoff e t a l. (2020), the predicted retail merger effects of five different bargaining and non-bargaining models for a 1 × 2 industry are evaluated. The primary contribution of this study is its unique application of Nashin-Shapley (NiS) bargains in the study of retail consolidation. It is novel in so far it compares the inherent implications of Nash-in-Nash (NiN) and NiS bargains for the appraisal of retail mergers. Pre-merger competitive outcomes with NiN predetermine a finding o f an anticompetitive merger. Contrarily, predictions with NiS as its starting point do not indicate that a merger would cause consumer harm, and therefore, would not be prohibited. In addition, the results suggest that retail consolidation consistently poses a viable option through which retailers can improve their profitability and bargaining positions. However, merger incentives are moderated by the competitiveness of an outside market.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractAFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: ’n Globale tendens van toenemende konsentrasie in die kleinhandelsektor en ’n verhoogde kommer oor koopkrag verg noodsaaklikerwys meer gesofistikeerde en aanpasbare samesmelting siftingsmetodes. Parameteriseerbare modelle van gesimuleerde samesmeltings wat op ’n geskikte wyse van die effekte van b edinging e n mededinging rekening hou, mag ’n oplossing bied. Dus, bestudeer hierdie proefskrif die effek van konsolidasie in ’n vertikaal verwante kleinhandelsektor met die gebruik van die samesmelting-simulasiemetode van Tschantz en Froeb (2019). Met die gebruik van die “flat logit nested” vraagfunksie vir gedifferensieerde produkte van Boshoff et al. (2020) word die uitkomste van vyf verskillende bedinging en nie-bedinging modelle vir ’n 1 × 2 industrie evalueer. Die primêre bydra van hierdie studie is sy unieke toepassing van Nash-in-Shapley (NiS) bedinging in die bestudering van konsolidasie in die kleinhandelsektor. Die studie is oorspronklik aangesien hierdie aanwending ’n kritiese vergelyking van die inherente implikasies van Nash-in-Nash (NiN) en NiS bedinging vir die beoordeling van samesmeltings toelaat. Pre-samesmelting NiN-modelle genereer toestande van oordrewe mededinging en sal daarom ’n bevinding van ’n anti-mededingende samesmelting vooraf bepaal. In teenstelling, sal ’n kleinhandel-samesmelting met NiS as sy beginpunt nie skade aan die verbruiker daarstel nie en sal daarom nie verbied word nie. Boonop, suggereer hierdie resultate dat kleinhandel-samesmeltings deurgaans ’n lewensvatbare opsie waardeur kleinhandelaars hul winsgewendheid en bedingingsposisie kan verbeter, bied. Daarbenewens, word die aansporings om saamte smelt deur die mededingendheid van ’n buite-mark gemodereer.af_ZA
dc.description.versionMasters
dc.format.extentviii, 68 pages : illustrations, includes annexures
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/124624
dc.language.isoen_ZAen_ZA
dc.publisherStellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
dc.rights.holderStellenbosch University
dc.subjectIndustrial organisation -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectIncentive scoring -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectVertical merger screening -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectEconomics -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectCompetition economics -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectMergers, bargaining competition -- South Africaen_ZA
dc.subjectUCTD
dc.titleSimulated horizontal mergers in vertically related marketsen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
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