South African Defence Policy-Making, 1994-2015
| dc.contributor.advisor | Esterhuyse, Abel | en_ZA |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Mandrup, Thomas | en_ZA |
| dc.contributor.author | Jordaan, Evert | en_ZA |
| dc.contributor.other | Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History. | en_ZA |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-07T09:37:10Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-08T14:21:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-11-07T09:37:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-01-08T14:21:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-12 | |
| dc.description | Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2023. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.abstract | ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study focused on the making of South African defence policy from 1994 to 2015. Since democratisation, South African defence spending declined as socio-economic development became the national priority. After integration, the South African National Defence Force struggled with affordability regarding its personnel, main equipment, internal deployments, and increasing operational involvement in African missions. The research question was to determine why there is a disconnect between the means and ends in South African defence policy since 1994. To answer this question, a theoretical case study with emphasis on domestic policy-making was done. The work of Graham Allison was used to analyse South African defence policy-making in terms of rational choice, organisational process, and bureaucratic politics. This study found that South African defence policy is not made in a rational, logical, or cost-effective manner – as society expects – but is predominantly influenced by party-political considerations and vested military institutional interests. Established strategy processes of rational choice within the military, including threat assessments and cost–benefit analysis are prevented from informing defence policy or from addressing the separation between the means and ends of policy. From a perspective of organisational process, the military has, in the absence of coherent and knowledgeable political direction, protected its institutional interests, culture, and expensive conventional equipment by using standard procedures, conventional warfare doctrine, and secrecy to resist civilian-led policy processes, legislative oversight, affordability, and austerity measures. As a result, the military has become isolated from government and society, making it politically ineffective to convince Treasury and Cabinet to fund defence appropriately. In terms of bureaucratic politics, the liberation struggle norms, values, culture, and subjective practice of civil–military relations within the African National Congress, dominate the making of defence policy within the executive branch of government and the legislature, with little distinction between party and state. Although defence ministers have significant power to determine defence policy, most lack the expertise, skill, and influence in cabinet to curb ambitious foreign policy, obtain support for a bigger defence budget or to deal with difficult trade-offs involving matters such as personnel nationalisation. The prominent role of Treasury in national planning and budgeting, as well as the skill and influence of its leaders within cabinet and the presidency, created a tense relationship with the military. Military leaders encultured with a war-funding model never adjusted to the bureaucratic politics in a democracy where the defence budget has to be justified in terms of national priorities and financial principles. Treasury was never consulted regarding the available funding for new defence policy, and the military avoided deal-making and compromise with Treasury. Consequently, since democratisation, South African defence was unaffordable. A key argument is that South African defence policy is based on the ruling party’s fears about what the military could do to jeopardise democracy and domestic and regional security rather than objective security realities, budgets, and threats. To address these fears, the military was willingly and conveniently tied to a conventional role, force design, and funding pattern, from which it could not escape. | en_ZA |
| dc.description.abstract | AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fokus van hierdie navorsing was op Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking vanaf 1994 tot 2015. Sedert demokratisering het Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsuitgawes verminder namate nasionale prioriteite na sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling geskuif het. Ná integrasie het die Suid- Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag met bekostigbaarheid van personeel, hooftoerusting, binnelandse ontplooiings, en toenemende operasionele betrokkenheid by sendings in Afrika gesukkel. Die navorsingsvraag fokus op die wanbalans tussen Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsoogmerke en beskikbare middele sedert 1994. Die vraag is beantwoord deur middel van ʼn teoretiese gevallestudie met die klem op binnelandse beleidmaking. Graham Allison se navorsing is gebruik om Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking ten opsigte van rasionele keuse, organisatoriese prosesse en burokratiese politiek te ontleed. Die studie het bevind dat Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid nie op ʼn rasionele, logiese, of koste- effektiewe manier – soos die samelewing verwag – gemaak word nie, maar deur partypolitieke oorwegings en gevestigde militêre institusionele belange oorheers word. Gevestigde strategiese prosesse van rasionele keuse in die weermag, met inbegrip van assessering van bedreigings en ontledings van die koste-voordeel, is verhinder om verdedigingsbeleid te omskryf, of om die gaping tussen beleidsoogmerke en middele, die hoof te bied. Gesien vanuit die perspektief van organisatoriese prosesse en in die afwesigheid van duidelike en kundige politieke leiding, het die weermag sy institusionele belange, kultuur, en duur konvensionele toerusting beskerm deur die gebruik van standaardprosedures, konvensionele gevegsdoktrine, en geheimhouding om beleidsprosesse onder burgerlike leiding, wetgewende oorsig, bekostigbaarheid, en besuinigingsmaatreëls teen te staan. Die weermag is gevolglik van die regering en die samelewing geïsoleer, en was polities ondoeltreffend om Tesourie en die Kabinet te oortuig om verdediging toepaslik te befonds. Wat burokratiese politiek betref, het die bevrydingsnorme, -waardes, -kultuur en subjektiewe aard van burgerlik–militêre verhoudinge van die African National Congress, verdedigingsbeleid deur beide die uitvoerende en wetgewende gesag oorheers met min skeiding tussen party en staat. Alhoewel verdedigingsministers beduidende mag het om verdedigingsbeleid te bepaal, beskik die meeste nie oor voldoende kundigheid, bekwaamheid en invloed in die Kabinet om vooruitstrewende buitelandse beleid aan bande te lê en steun te werf vir ʼn groter verdedigingsbegroting of moeilike kompromieë ten opsigte van kwessies soos personeelbesnoeiings nie. Die prominente rol wat Tesourie in nasionale beplanning en begroting speel, asook die bekwaamheid en invloedrykheid van Tesourieleierskap in die kabinet en presidensie, het beduidende spanning teenoor die weermag geskep. Militêre leiers wat aan ʼn oorlogbefondsingsmodel gewoond is, kon nooit aanpas by die burokratiese politiek in ʼn demokrasie waar die verdedigingsbegroting met inagneming van nasionale prioriteite en finansiële beginsels geregverdig moes word nie. Tesourie is nie geraadpleeg insake die beskikbare befondsing vir nuwe verdedigingsbeleid nie, en die weermag het kompromieë en ooreenkomste met Tesourie vermy. Gevolglik is Suid-Afrikaanse verdediging sedert 1994 onbekostigbaar. ʼn Sleutelargument in die studie was dat die vrese van die regerende party met betrekking tot wat die weermag kon doen om demokrasie en binnelandse en streeksveiligheid te ondermyn, die grondslag van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid gevorm het eerder as objektiewe veiligheidsrealiteite, begrotings en bedreigings. Om hierdie vrese die hoof te bied, is die weermag gewilliglik en gerieflik beperk tot ʼn konvensionele rol, magsontwerp en befondsingspatroon waaruit dit nie kon ontsnap nie. | af_ZA |
| dc.description.version | Doctoral | en_ZA |
| dc.format.extent | xix, 567 pages | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/128879 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University | en_ZA |
| dc.rights.holder | Stellenbosch University | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Military policy | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Regime change | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | South Africa. South African Defence Force | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | African National Congress | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | South Africa -- Politics and government -- 1994- | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | National Treasury (South Africa) -- Appropriations and expenditures | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Budget -- South Africa | en_ZA |
| dc.subject.name | UCTD | |
| dc.title | South African Defence Policy-Making, 1994-2015 | en_ZA |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_ZA |
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