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Browsing by Author "Scholtz, Leopold"

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Die Afrikaner en die demokrasie I : die negentiende eeu
(Historical Association of South Africa, 2002) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
This is the first of two articles in which the authors try to establish at least part of the reasons why the Afrikaners, with their strong democratic antecedents of the nineteenth century, became the perpretators of undemocratic practices after 1948. The pioneer circumstances of the nineteenth century and the regard for patriarchs produced the possibility of both a democratic and an authoritarian development. Calvinism as a source of Afrikaner political thought is largely discarded by the authors, but the Enlightenment played a significant role in the nineteenth-century political theory. However, it appears that the patriarchal tradition won from the pioneer situation and the Enlightenment, as the legislatives of the two Boer republics jealously protected their powers and claimed full and unfettered powers inbetween elections.
Die Afrikaner en die demokrasie II : die dekades voor 1948
(Historical Association of South Africa, 2002) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
The Afrikaner and democracy II : the decades before 1948
In this second and last part of a series the authors show that one of the most intense Afrikaner debates of the thirties and forties revolved around the nature of liberal democracy, capitalism and imperialism. The need of so many poor Afrikaners, and the fact that capitalism was seen as the other side of the coin of British imperialism, brought about a situation where many Afrikaner thinkers and politicians sought refuge under the umbrella of national socialism. The main protagonist of this trend was the Ossewa-Brandwag (Ox-wagon Sentinel or OB), but in the power struggle with the National Party (NP), the last mentioned also became infected with national socialist about democracy. However, after the OB neutralised itself by not participating in the 1943 election, these ideas largely fizzled out. Nevertheless, in the process the NP started usurping the sovereignty which previously was reserved for the volk and parliament. In the end, this helped bring about a situation where the abuse of power of the NP reign became possible.
Die Britse imperialisme, die Anglo-Boereoorlog en die ontstaan van apartheid
(Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2002) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
Historical events are not beforehand cast in stone, and this is also the case with the Afrikaners' eventual choice for apartheid and an authoritarian system. In this paper the authors show that an Afrikaner protoliberalism existed during the nineteenth century, and that things could have gone either way, had external factors in the form of British imperialism not intervened. This protoliberalism came under pressure during the last years of the century due to the advance of British imperialism, which reached its zenith during the Anglo~Boer War. The war and ils aftermath, including the impoverishment it caused (which culminated during the Depression in the thirties). subjectively caused Afrikaners to fear for the survival of their people. In these circumstances, the proto-liberalism of the nineteenth century was effectively extinguished. A zero-sum game grew in the relations between Afrikaners and blacks, and in the end aparlheid was devised as an instrnment for survival. In this process, the only liberal paradigm surviving in South Africa was the Biitish variant, which was subjectively seen as a tool of British imperialism, thereby closing ojfthe liberal avenue in the political culture of the Afrikaners.
Clausewitz, Mao Zedong en die Anglo-Boereoorlog
(Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2001) Scholtz, Leopold
In the military historiography (as opposed to the social historiography) of the Anglo-Boer War, there is an abundance of reconstructions o f what exactly happened, more or less along the lines of Ranke's ideal. However, there is a paucity of theoretical and analytical studies. In this paper, a theoretical model is constructed on the basis of the military thoughts of the Prussian theoretician Carl von Clausewitz, who wrote extensively about the nature of war as such, and the Chinese leader Mao Zedong, whose writings are essential for the understanding of guerrilla warfare. Clausewitz's thoughts are traced regarding the political nature of war, the correlation between the totality of war and the totality of the war aim, and his embryonic ideas on guerrilla war. Mao's ideas are also analyzed regarding the political nature of war, but are developed especially in the light of his writings about the three stages of guerrilla war, the need for liberated base areas, the fact that gucnillas need to disperse their forces as widely as possible (the relationship between force and space),and the indispensable role of the local population (the "fish in the water" theory). Presently the Anglo-Boer War is measured against this model. The conclusions are that the British and Boer war aims both developed to such a radical extent that only a total victory or defeat was possible, and that essentially this is the explanation for the total character the war developed during its second phase. Mao's theory is also used to explain why the Boer guerrilla campaign remained strategically fruitless. Together, Clausewitz and Mao furnish an explanation not just for what happened, but why it happened that way and what it means.
Cuito Cuanavale - wie het werklik Gewen? 'n Strategiese en Operasionele Ontleding
(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 1998) Scholtz, Leopold
The Angolan campaign of 1987- '88 came as the culmination of a long and bitter war between South Africa and Swapo. Although South Africa's underlying intention was to limit Swapo's guerilla war to the territory of Ovambo, this could only succeed if the Angolan rebel movement Unita could continue covering the southeastern part of Angola. It was, therefore, in South Africa's interest to prevent Unita from being removed from the equation by the massive MPLA offensive of late winter and spring 1987. This was the basic reason for the county’s intervention with Operation Modulêr. The operation was, however, run with excessive operational control from Pretoria. Instead of allowing the officers on the ground a classic Liddell Hartian indirect approach by marching northwards west of the Cuito river to cut the advancing MPLA forces from their logistical hinterland and dislocating their offensive by attacking them from behind, Pretoria forced them into a direct head-on approach east of the river. The reason was to keep the South African involvement secret or, at the very least 'plausibly deniable' - a naïve expectation. This did indeed result in a spectacular South African tactical victory at the Lomba River, where the MPLA offensive was decisively beaten back. But thereafter the South African forces were forced into a series of frontal attacks on increasingly well prepared MPLA defensive positions, including three final attacks on well fortified positions at Tumpo, which were beaten back, resulting in a subsequent stalemate. The stalemate was then brilliantly broken by Cuban forces, who marched to the southwestern Namibian border, threatening to cut the South Africans off at Tumpo, or alternatively to invade Namibia. The campaign is analysed in the light of military theory, especially the ideas of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart. The conclusion is that the MPLA lost badly, that South Africa reached its strategic objectives but did badly operationally, and that Cuba came out of the affair with flying colours.
Die debat oor die posisie van Afrikaans aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch : 'n ontleding
(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2008-09) Scholtz, Ingrid; Scholtz, Leopold
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die debat oor die plek van Afrikaans en Engels as onderrigmedium aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch het sedert sy begin in 2002 nie baie duidelikheid verskaf nie. In dié artikel word ’n poging aangewend om die debat te analiseer en vas te stel waar en waarom die opponente verskil. Om dinge kort te hou is drie verteenwoordigers van albei kante – die sogenaamde A-opsioniste en die T-opsioniste – vergelyk. Die eerste groep meen dat dubbelmedium noodwendig lei tot die verdwyning van die swakker taal, in dié geval Afrikaans; dat die Universiteit in werklikheid nie eens die minimum voorwaardes vir die T-opsie nakom nie; dat die dubbelmediumprojek ideologies gedrewe is; en dat dit die belange van die arm gekleurde Afrikaanssprekende studente verwaarloos. Die T-opsioniste is van mening dat ’n universiteit se taak nie is om ’n taal te beskerm nie, maar om akademiese uitnemendheid te bevorder; dat eentalige Afrikaanse onderrig die Universiteit op die glybaan na parogialisme en isolasie plaas; dat ’n multikulturele benadering beter is as kulturele apartheid; en dat die beweging na Engels noodsaaklik is vir transformasie. Die argumente word dan geweeg, en die slotsom is dat waar die A-opsioniste hul argumente hoofsaaklik op akademiese en pedagogiese gronde baseer, die T-opsioniste se benadering veral ideologies is. Daar word ook bevind dat die Topsie op Stellenbosch sodanig toegepas word dat die eindproduk waarskynlik eerder ’n eentalige Engelse Stellenbosch is.
Die Eerste Wereldoorlog as faktor in die Suid- Afrikaanse toetrede tot die internasionale gemeenskap
(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2016-03) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
When the First World War started on 4 August, 1914, the Union of South Africa was barely four years old. In international terms the country was on the far end of the world and not very important. In addition, the country was a self-governing British Dominion, not able to pursue an independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, at the Versailles Peace Treaty of1919, co-signed by its representatives, Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, South Africa was recognised as a player in its own right on the international political podium. This was brought about by especially two factors. The first was South Africa's military role in occupying German South West Africa and its important role in the occupation of German East Africa. The second was the participation of an infantry brigade on the Western Front in France and Flanders. Although this role was limited, it was exploited to the hilt by Jan Smuts during his sojourn in London and Paris during 1917-1919. Smuts was received as a hero when he arrived in London in the first months of 1917, and became a member of both the Imperial War Cabinet and the British War Cabinet. As such, his contribution to the Imperial Conference of April 1917 was conclusive in getting recognition for the Dominions' right to independence - although it would take until 1926 and 1931 for this to be legally formalised. Nevertheless, Smuts played a decisive role in winning the right for the Dominions to be represented in their own right at the Paris Peace Conference and sign the Versailles Peace Treaty. In the months before the Armistice of November 1918, he was Prime Minister David Lloyd George's right hand man and did an unbelievable amount of work, including advising the British High Command on Western Front operations, the founding of the Royal Air Force, solving various labour disputes and even sounding out the Austrians about peace. After the Armistice, Smuts played a huge role in conjunction with President Woodrow Wilson in bringing about the League of Nations. However, the last weeks before the Peace saw Smuts locked in a bitter fight with French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau-full of hatred for the despised Boches - as well as Woodrow Wilson (who had all but abandoned his own conciliatory approach) and an opportunistic, vaccillating Lloyd George, Smuts resisted the severe peace conditions dictated to the Germans. He repeatedly drew the others 'attention to the British magnanimity after the Anglo-Boer War as an example of how conciliation could be achieved, and pleaded for a similar approach to the Germans. Moreover, he saw that Germany had to play a decisive role in any future Europe. He feared that the severe conditions would fuel so much bitterness in Germany that it could lead to a future war - which, of course, did happen barely 20 years later. Smuts felt so strongly about this that he threatened not to sign the peace treaty, and it took massive pressure by Lloyd George and his own Prime Minister, Louis Botha, to change his mind. Nevertheless, in spite of his failure, by June 1919 especially Smuts had carved out for South Africa an international standing which nobody could have imagined five years previously.
Iraq 2003 (Part 1) : the road to war
(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 2004) Scholtz, Leopold
Most wars in the post-Second World War era, Vietnam included, have been pretty controversial. This has especially been regarding the motivation for the wars. But also the conduct of the conflicts – the strategy, operations and tactics – have been thoroughly debated and second-guessed. Although it was fought only recently, the Iraq War has been no exception. In most countries, public opinion was set squarely against the war. And although there was widespread support for the war in America and Britain, a vocal minority made itself loudly heard. As far as the conduct of the war was concerned, every arm-chair general (including several retired military officers) pronounced away on whether the operational plan was adequate, if enough troops were involved, whether it was based on the right premises, etc. Now that the fog of war has cleared somewhat, it may be possible to offer a first military analysis of the war. The purpose of this analysis will, therefore, be to look at the coalition security strategy which preceded the war, to compare the opposing armed forces and the operational plans, as well as the operations themselves. It will also be relevant to ask whether the war would have been as successful against a better armed, trained and led enemy. Finally, the purpose is to identify and analyse the main strategic and operational decisions on both sides, and to provisionally assess the military lessons emanating from the war, including those which may be of particular relevance to the South African National Defence Force.
Iraq 2003 (Part 2) : the road to Baghdad
(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 2004) Scholtz, Leopold
The attack on Iraq, or Operation Iraqi Freedom as it was called, would be very different from its predecessor Operation Desert Storm, 12 years before. The main strategic difference was, of course, the fact that Desert Storm encompassed an enormous international military coalition, with ground, air and naval forces being supplied by America, Britain, France, Italy, Australia, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. Iraqi Freedom was shouldered by only two countries, the US and the UK, with Australia supplying a small contingent of SAS troops, the Czech Republic a platoon of chemical warfare troops and Spain a hospital ship. To drive the Iraqi occupying forces out of Kuwait in 1991, an enormous force of 15 divisions had been amassed. These had been organised into 3 American corps (XVIII Airborne Corps, consisting of two airborne divisions, a mechanised infantry division, as well as a French light armoured division; VII Corps, consisting of three US and one UK armoured divisions and one US mechanised infantry division; and a US Marine corps, consisting of two Marine divisions), a Saudi Arabian corps of two divisions, an Egyptian corps of two divisions, and a Syrian division.3 For Iraqi Freedom, only a single army corps (V), consisting of two mechanised infantry divisions and an airborne division, together with a marine division, an understrength composite British armoured division, and some smaller independent units, was available. And because of political wrangling, one mechanised infantry division arrived far too late on the battlefield to participate in the fighting. So, compared to 15 divisions in 1991, the job would now have to be done by only four. Nevertheless, with the new American weapons of precision and the extremely able Abrams tank, a repeat of Gulf War I was not really necessary.
Die Konferensie van Kabwe en die ANC/SAKP se gewapende stryd
(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2011-12) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die ANC/SAKP se bewerings dat sy gewapende stryd ’n hoë morele inhoud had, word in dié artikel onder die loep geneem. Die gevolgtrekking is dat dit tot 1983 inderdaad ten doel gehad het om burgerlike ongevalle te vermy. Die eskalasie van die stryd het egter in 1983 gelei tot die Kerkstraatbom, toe 19 mense – met inbegrip van 12 burgerlikes – gedood is. Te Kabwe het die ANC in 1985 verder ooreengekom dat die moontlikheid van burgerlike ongevalle nie meer in die pad van die gewapende stryd kon staan nie. Dit is met die voetsoolvlak gekommunikeer op ’n manier dat die operateurs kon verstaan dat alle vroeëre morele grense oorskry mog word, en die gevolg was ’n ordinêre terreurveldtog wat moreel met dié van Al-Kaïda gelykstaan. Teen 1987 het die leiers vir die slegte publisiteit geskrik en MK probeer inhou, maar die gewapende vleuel was buite beheer. Bowendien het die gewapende stryd, volgens ANC-leiers se eie erkenning, misluk.
The media and the military : allies or adversaries?
(Stellenbosch University, Military Science, 1998) Scholtz, Leopold
Military commanders like Alexander the Great or Richard the Lionheart did not have to take public opinion greatly into account when they planned their campaigns in their day. Today it is a very different situation. In the light of the above this article starts with two somewhat startling quotes by the futurologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler: "The people thinking hardest about warfare in the future know that some of the most important combat of tomorrow will take place on the media battlefield." They also state: “[T]he media, including channels and technologies unimagined today, will be a prime weapon for Third Wave combatants in both the wars and anti-wars of the future, a key component of knowledge strategy.” In recent years, much has been made of the adversarial relations between journalists and the military. The media have, for instance, been blamed for the US defeat in Vietnam, for unthinkingly blabbing about tactical decisions in advance in the Falklands, etc. From their side, journalists have been blaming the military for not trying to understand the nature of their job, of covering up a number of bad things, etc.
Nelson Mandela se houding teenoor die kommunisme
(Historical Association of South Africa, 2014-11) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
Die doel van dié artikel is om wyle oudpres. Nelson Mandela se houding teenoor die kommunisme, wat 'n wit vlek in die geskiedenis vorm, uit te lig en die mitevorming rondom die saak op 'n akademiese wyse af te breek. Die doel is pertinent nie om sy beeld af te breek nie; slegs om 'n versweë aspek van sy lewe te belig. Om dit te bereik is grotendeels staat gemaak op Mandela se eie geskrifte in die jare vyftig, voor hy tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf gevonnis is, asook twee belangrike geskrifte uit die jare sewentig, waarvan een die onlangs gepubliseerde, geheime outobiografie is wat hy op Robbeneiland geskryf het. Daar is ook staat gemaak op die nuutste bevindings van akademiese historici rakende Mandela se relatief kortstondige lidmaatskap van die SA Kommunistiese Party. Die gevolgtrekkings is kortliks dat Mandela in die laat vyftigs en vroeë sestigs 'n senior lid van die SAKP was, en dat hy dit toe om taktiese redes en met toestemming van die party laat vaar het. Verder was hy reeds in die vroeë jare vyftig 'n onkritiese aanhanger van die Marxisme-Leninisme, en hy het dié geloof minstens tot die laat jare sewentig gehou. In die loop van die jare tagtig, en veral ná sy vrylating in 1990, het hy klaarblyklik ingesien dat hy sy geloof moet wysig.
Pirrhiese oorwinning : die Oorlog in Kosovo
(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 1999) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
Net soos elke historiese gebeurtenis is elke oorlog uniek. Tog vertoon die oorlog in Kosovo soveel eienskappe wat totaal afwyk van feitlik elke vorige oorlog in die geskiedenis dat dit die moeite kan loon om dit van nader te bekyk. So was daar min oorloë - dalk geen enkele - wat in soveel omstredenheid ontvang en gebore is en so 'n enorme openbare debat (en veral kritiek) uitgelok het. Die uitlating van die Britse krygshistorikus Alistair Home is tipies van die fiole van toom wat wêreldwyd oor die hoofde van die beplanners en uitvoerders van Operasie Allied Force uitgestort is: "Like many people of my generation who know Yugoslavia, the past two months have made me utterly miserable. As a military historian having written about many wars, and served in one, I cannot recall any campaign that I have disliked so much." Dit was die eerste oorlog in die ganse geskiedenis wat (in elk geval aan Navo se kant) nie soseer om redes van harde strategiese eiebelang gevoer is nie, maar om 'n "sagte" rede soos menseregte. En dit het aanleiding gegee tot 'n nuwe internasionale politieke leer op grond waarvan sekere groot moondhede hulle nou die reg toe-eien om in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van soewereine state in te gryp wanneer menseregte verkrag word. Op operasionele vlak was dit die eerste oorlog in die geskiedenis waar die finale uitklophou nie deur 'n grondoffensief gegee moes word nie, waar die wenners feitlik uitsluitend op lugaanvalle staatgemaak het, en waar die wenners geen enkele ongeval in gevegte gely het nie. Dis ook duidelik dat die oorlog 'n fundamentele keerpunt in die na-Koue-Oorlogse geskiedenis beteken. Trouens, 'n mens kan redeneer dat dit die einde van die na-Koue-Oorlogse era was en die begin van 'n nuwe, nog ondefinieerbare historiese fase ingelui het. Die feit, so sal ons verder sien, was een van die belangrikste redes.waarom die oorlog die katalisator geword het om Rusland en China drasties van die Weste te vervreem.
The Suwalki GAP dilemma : a strategic and operational analysis
(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 2020) Scholtz, Leopold
This article reports on a theoretical analysis about a series of events that will hopefully never take place. Should Russia ever decide to invade the Baltic republics, the obvious invasion route would be from Russian territory into Estonia and Latvia, and perhaps also from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad into Lithuania. Authoritative war games have found that Russian forces could reach the three Baltic capitals within 36–60 hours. NATO has decided on a counterstrategy, stationing 5 000 troops in the three republics and Poland, as well as establishing a rapid reaction force of 13 000 troops, capable of being at the front in a week. Nevertheless, this article argues that this is probably insufficient. These troops will have to move through the so-called Suwalki Gap (80 kilometres wide) between Kaliningrad and Belarus, a close Russian ally, which could be closed by a determined Russian push. The article ends with a war scenario, which shows that any clash could rapidly escalate into a general war.
Voels van eenderse vere : die totalitere ideologiee in die twintigste eeu
(Historical Association of South Africa, 2001) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, Ingrid
Birds of a feather: totalitarian ideologies in the twentieth century For various reasons it has long been taboo to name communism and national socialism in the same breath or to compare them. Since the publication of Stéphane Courtois' sensational book about the crimes of communism in 1997 this is, however, being done more and more. In this article the comparison is made by looking at the systemic resemblances and differences, the natural affinity that leaders like Hitler and Mussolini on the one hand and Stalin on the other displayed towards each other, and the easy way in which they exchanged their enmity for cooperation. the conclusion is that there were indeed differences in content, but that the way in which they manifested themselves in practice, the mentality behind the ideologies, showed great similarities.

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