Browsing by Author "Palk, Andrea Christy"

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    Moral bioenhancement: an ethical and philosophical investigation
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2018-03) Palk, Andrea Christy; Van Niekerk, Anton A.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.
    ENGLISH SUMMARY: It has been argued, in the bioethics literature, that traditional forms of moral instruction and development are no longer adequate in equipping humanity to address the urgent nature of the ethical problems facing contemporary societies. Rather than continuing to rely upon these supposedly ineffective methods, we should explore the possibility of biologically enhancing our morality. This would entail both decreasing the likelihood that we would wish to cause harm to others as well as increasing our motivation to do good. The proponents of moral bioenhancement argue that the best way of achieving this would be to isolate which affective dispositions, that are associated with moral traits, are susceptible to biological modification and to biologically enhance these dispositions. However, despite the presence of strong consequentialist arguments in favour of moral bioenhancement, it has elicited a variety of ethical concerns as well as conceptual and practical problems that would have to be addressed for it to become a coherent possibility. An ethical concern that has been raised in the literature is the concern that moral bioenhancement is wrong, in principle, and regardless of any benefits it could produce, because it risks negatively impacting phenomena that are regarded as intrinsically valuable. In particular, the concern is that moral bioenhancement could impact our moral autonomy, and thus, threaten human morality as such. This concern is based upon the view that the conditions for the exercise of autonomous moral behaviour, and thus morality itself, lie in the deliberation and choice that must be freely made in the face of competing demands. In other words, if it became possible to biologically increase our motivation to do good, thereby increasing the likelihood that we act in a way that is regarded as morally desirable, could our resultant behaviour still be regarded as morally autonomous; or, is morality solely a product of our given, unaltered biological predispositions, working in conjunction with traditional mechanisms of moral education? Will morality as we know it disappear if moral bioenhancement becomes a possibility? This dissertation contributes towards the literature through a comprehensive review in which particular conceptual, philosophical and empirical problems are addressed, as well as by providing a structured discussion of the practical and theoretical ethical concerns regarding moral bioenhancement. The dissertation includes a substantive definition of moral bioenhancement and makes further independent contributions through the analysis and application of a coherence theory of autonomy to ascertain the status for moral autonomy of various outcomes of moral bioenhancement interventions. From this analysis, a checklist of interventions that could be potentially inimical to autonomy, in terms of their outcomes, is constructed. The conclusion is that in certain cases, moral bioenhancement could produce an increase, rather than a decrease, in the level of autonomy experienced by individuals.
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    The morality of transhumanism : assessing human dignity arguments
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014-03) Palk, Andrea Christy; Van Niekerk, Anton A.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The transhumanist movement propounds the view that the evolution of humanity must be extricated from the contingencies of blind natural selection and actively directed by human beings themselves, utilising existing as well as nascent technologies, in order to radically enhance and thus transform individual human capabilities to levels which far surpass current capacities. Transhumanism has elicited vehement critique, however, due to the claim that the transformations it proposes will result in a new posthuman species; and thus, that its aims represent a violation of human dignity. In order to assess this claim it is necessary to firstly investigate the aims and values of the transhumanist movement, as well as the technological means through which it proposes these aims will be fulfilled. This task is the focus of the first half of this thesis. Secondly, the concept of dignity itself must be examined in order to ascertain its status as a means of critiquing transhumanism. The second half of this thesis therefore explicates the notion of dignity by tracing its historical interpretations and uses, as well as the way in which it has been employed to uphold human rights and to adjudicate bioethical dilemmas in the contemporary milieu. This investigation enables the assessment of the two most renowned dignity arguments, namely, the arguments of the bioconservative thinkers Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama which have been lodged against transhumanism, as well as the counter-argument of the transhumanist Nick Bostrom. In light of this discussion, the conclusion is that the notion of dignity is plagued by irrevocable ambiguity, vagueness and inconsistencies, due to the presence of conflicting interpretations. These findings have implications for the concept’s efficacy to adjudicate the complex ethical conundrums posed, not only by transhumanism, but in the bioethics arena in general.