Browsing by Author "Jordaan, Evert"
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- ItemAnatomy of post-communist European defense institutions : the mirage of military modernity(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 2020) Jordaan, EvertIn Anatomy of post-communist European defense institutions: The mirage of military modernity, Thomas-Durell Young’s aim was to determine why Central and Eastern European (CEE) states have failed to apply democratic defence governance concepts, despite 25 years of Western assistance programmes.
- ItemThe battle of Kursk : an appraisal of the Soviet and German operational doctrines(Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2003) Esterhuyse, Abel; Jordaan, EvertOperation Zitadelle (Citadel), the German attack on the Kursk salient on 5 July 1943, constituted the final attempt by the German Army to retain its operational initiative on the Eastern Front. The Russians knew that the Kursk salient was a great temptation to the German Army. The German General Staff's classic reaction to an enemy promontory, an enemy -held outpost stretching beyond the general run of the front line, had always been to pinch the promontory off by attacking each of its flanks simultaneously. This was precisely what the Germans did at Kursk when Field Marshall HG von Kluge attacked the salient from the north, while Lieutenant-General FE von Manstein struck it from the south.
- ItemCollective security in Africa : the tension between theory and practice(Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, 2017) Jordaan, EvertThe promotion of peace and security in Africa necessitates security cooperation between states and collective security remains a way to pursue it. This paper explores the changed meaning and application of the concept of collective security within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to deal with both interstate and intrastate security concerns within the African Union (AU). Since the AU has made clear commitments to collective security, the aim is to determine to what extent the AU subscribed to collective security and applied it in terms of coercion, which includes interventions. While dealing with genocide, war crimes and extended presidential terms remains problematic, the AU has taken an assertive stand with the use of coercion in cases of unconstitutional changes of government. The article highlights the tension between the theory and practice of collective security in Africa.
- ItemRecce : small team missions behind enemy lines(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 2015) Jordaan, EvertRecce: Small team missions behind enemy lines is an autobiography by Colonel (retired) Koos Stadler. The book mainly covers his career as a Special Forces officer and reconnaissance soldier during South Africa’s so-called Border War in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) and Angola, and his involvement in operations against the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). It also covers operations against the African National Congress (ANC) and Angolan forces.
- ItemSouth African Defence Policy-Making, 1994-2015(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2023-12 ) Jordaan, Evert; Esterhuyse, Abel; Mandrup, Thomas; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study focused on the making of South African defence policy from 1994 to 2015. Since democratisation, South African defence spending declined as socio-economic development became the national priority. After integration, the South African National Defence Force struggled with affordability regarding its personnel, main equipment, internal deployments, and increasing operational involvement in African missions. The research question was to determine why there is a disconnect between the means and ends in South African defence policy since 1994. To answer this question, a theoretical case study with emphasis on domestic policy-making was done. The work of Graham Allison was used to analyse South African defence policy-making in terms of rational choice, organisational process, and bureaucratic politics. This study found that South African defence policy is not made in a rational, logical, or cost-effective manner – as society expects – but is predominantly influenced by party-political considerations and vested military institutional interests. Established strategy processes of rational choice within the military, including threat assessments and cost–benefit analysis are prevented from informing defence policy or from addressing the separation between the means and ends of policy. From a perspective of organisational process, the military has, in the absence of coherent and knowledgeable political direction, protected its institutional interests, culture, and expensive conventional equipment by using standard procedures, conventional warfare doctrine, and secrecy to resist civilian-led policy processes, legislative oversight, affordability, and austerity measures. As a result, the military has become isolated from government and society, making it politically ineffective to convince Treasury and Cabinet to fund defence appropriately. In terms of bureaucratic politics, the liberation struggle norms, values, culture, and subjective practice of civil–military relations within the African National Congress, dominate the making of defence policy within the executive branch of government and the legislature, with little distinction between party and state. Although defence ministers have significant power to determine defence policy, most lack the expertise, skill, and influence in cabinet to curb ambitious foreign policy, obtain support for a bigger defence budget or to deal with difficult trade-offs involving matters such as personnel nationalisation. The prominent role of Treasury in national planning and budgeting, as well as the skill and influence of its leaders within cabinet and the presidency, created a tense relationship with the military. Military leaders encultured with a war-funding model never adjusted to the bureaucratic politics in a democracy where the defence budget has to be justified in terms of national priorities and financial principles. Treasury was never consulted regarding the available funding for new defence policy, and the military avoided deal-making and compromise with Treasury. Consequently, since democratisation, South African defence was unaffordable. A key argument is that South African defence policy is based on the ruling party’s fears about what the military could do to jeopardise democracy and domestic and regional security rather than objective security realities, budgets, and threats. To address these fears, the military was willingly and conveniently tied to a conventional role, force design, and funding pattern, from which it could not escape.
- ItemSouth African defence since 1994 : a study of policy-making(Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2005-04) Jordaan, Evert; Seegers, A.; Esterhuyse, A. J.; University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Sciences. Dept. of School for Security and Africa Studies. Military Strategy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, its defence policy changed fundamentally. The African National Congress (ANC) as the upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence policy. Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states. The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence. NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its power projection capabilities. Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models. Secondly, models can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy. NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their interests. Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified. Firstly, that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important. This makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible. Defence policy therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views. Secondly, although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority. Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making.