Browsing by Author "De Wet, Natasja"

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    A close eye on SCOPA : A South African case study on parliamentary oversight and scrutiny
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2006-12) De Wet, Natasja; Breytenbach, W. J.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Political Science.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Parliamentary scrutiny and oversight can be seen as the most important tool to hold the executive, and therefore government, to account. It enforces an effective system of checks and balances in order to ensure that taxpayers are receiving value for their money, and that their needs are being catered for. This thesis will analyze the oversight framework in South Africa by examining the structures and functions of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in contrast to other strong oversight frameworks such as exist in the US Congress and Scandinavia. Dominant factors that affect the manner in which the executive is held to account, such as the role of the Chapter Nine Independent Institutions (the Auditor General and the Public Protector) and their respective Constitutional mandates (versus the committee system which has not been included as a section in the Constitution), will be brought into the spotlight. Also, the effect that a dominant party system (ensuring an ANC majority) has on parliamentary oversight will be compared with the Westminster system, which fails to effectively separate governing party interests from the respective mandates of the three spheres of government (the judiciary, legislature and the executive). This can degenerate into feckless pluralism. An examination of these actors and factors will help determine the extent to which SCOPA has been successful in enforcing the accountability of organs of the state. By determining the strengths and weaknesses of SCOPA, this thesis will determine whether the committee can be seen as the potent watchdog of parliament, or the friendly 'Goofy-dog' of government. Important findings rest on the assumption that COPA is not isolated from party politics, and an interdependent and complementary relationship between Parliament, Parliamentary Committees and the Chapter Nine Independent Institutions have not been consolidated.