Department of Public Law
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Browsing Department of Public Law by Author "Bezuidenhout, A. E. M. (Anna Elizabeth Martha)"
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- ItemDie gelding van die volkereg in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 1990-12) Bezuidenhout, A. E. M. (Anna Elizabeth Martha); Erasmus, M. G.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Law. Dept. of Public Law .ENGLISH ABSTRACT: According to Rumpf£ CJ in the Nduli decision, Roman-Dutch law is the fons et origo of the statement that customary international law is part of South African law. His sources, Fran~ois and Huber, are open to criticism because they are not Roman-Dutch authorities on this specific question, but the decisions in Ncumata v Matwa (1881-2), Du Toit v Kruger (1905), and Rex v Lionda (1944) emphasise that the reception of customary international law in South African law has taken place through Roman law. Various court decisions emphasise that the term Roman-Dutch law should not be interpreted narrowly, as it includes the common law of the whole of Western Europe and not only of the province Holland. If this quotation is interpreted in an ius commune context, it is clear why Rumpf£ CJ did not cite specific sources to prove his point: he accepted it as a given fact- as the jurists did in the middle ages. Roman-Dutch law serves only as a frame of reference out of which international law has developed. The courts therefore apply international law as international law and not as, for example, common law. Two important implications follow: firstly it means that customary international law need not to be transformed before the courts can apply the relevant rule and secondly that new rules of customary international law automatically form part of the law of South Africa. From the eighty South African court decisions discussed, it is clear that the courts do take judicial notice of customary international law. This justifies the statement that the judiciary regards customary international law as part of the law of South Africa since 1879. The influence of English law on this section of South African law must, according to Rumpf£ CJ, also be taken into account. The reason is that English law is the common law of the South African constitutional law which influences the application of international law by the courts. This can extend the courts' frame of reference. Only a fifth of the cases discussed refer to Roman-Dutch writers, and then only in a comparative sense. The South African courts rely mainly on Anglo-American decisions and tendencies. The South African courts follow their English counterparts by accepting the same qualifications on the general rule that customary international law forms part of the law of the land. The willingness of the courts to apply customary international law has diminished over the years especially in cases where state security features. It seems that politically contentious questions play an inhibiting role on the readiness of the courts to apply customary international law where conflict, real or imaginary, between customary international law and municipal law appears. Acts of state constitute the most important obstacle in the application of customary international law, because they could lead to the court abandoning its independent judicial function in favour of the executive. Because the South African courts follow the English law in this area also, it is assumed that safety measures developed there would be adopted by the South African courts to prevent their jurisdiction from being limited too easily. It is recommended that more attention should be given to the existence and application of customary international law principles and that a conscious effort must be made by the judiciary to resolve conflict between customary international law and municipal law and to do it in such a manner that due account is taken of the fact that in South Africa customary international law is part of the law of the land.