Department of Strategic Studies
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Browsing Department of Strategic Studies by browse.metadata.advisor "Vrey, Francois"
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- ItemMilitary Intervention in Africa after the Cold War(Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2010-03) Ramuhala, Mashudu Godfrey; Vrey, Francois; Liebenberg, Ian; University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies. Dept. of Military Strategy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success.
- ItemTwenty years of democracy: An analysis of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa since 1994(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2019-04) Janse van Rensburg, Wilhelm Keyter; Vrey, Francois; Neethling, Theo; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Sciences. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military Strategy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Prior to 1994, the practice of parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa was extremely limited. The post-1994 shift to liberal democracy characterised by representativeness and constitutionalism brought about significant changes to the state’s civil-military relations. Within the paradigm of liberalism, civil-military relations were reshaped to ensure civil-supremacy over the military. Parliament, a central feature of representative democracy, emerged as a key institution to ensure democratic civil-military relations. This thesis reviews parliamentary oversight of the military in South Africa between 1994 and 2014 in the context of democratic civil-military relations and the associated characteristics of transparency and accountability. Two distinct parliamentary periods characterised the first twenty years of democracy. The first ten years focused on Parliament’s legislative function while a shift to its oversight function is observed after 2004. Oversight of the military is reviewed separately for these two periods. The study compiles a list of criteria for the review of parliamentary oversight of the military and applies such criteria to the two identified periods. This criteria include the availability and extensive use of oversight tools such as committee hearings, hearings in the plenary, commissions of inquiry, parliamentary questions (oral and written) and interpellations. For parliaments to thoroughly oversee the military, several focus areas were also identified, including the defence budget, policies, procurement, human resources and the deployment of the military. The study aims to enhance these criteria by looking at lower-order focus areas, including annual and quarterly departmental performance, interdepartmental cooperation, military training and education, gender and racial equality, defence morale and defence infrastructure. Furthermore, potential weaknesses for oversight of the military are identified, including the constitutional and legal powers to do oversight; resources and expertise available to parliaments; the political will to conduct oversight; and, follow-up on parliamentary recommendations. Through the application of the criteria above, the study finds that during the first two parliaments (1994 to 2004) efforts were made to define defence policy and legislation within the newfound liberal democratic context. After 2004, focus shifted to the institutions’ oversight function. Parliamentary processes, structures and oversight-enhancing legislation improved significantly between 2004 and 2014 to enrich the potential for thorough oversight. Based on these improvements, and the relatively elevated levels of oversight already achieved by the defence committees in the First Parliament, a continuously improved level of parliamentary oversight of the military could thus be expected. However, oversight of the military did not improve in line with the institutional scope offered for improvement. There was a shift away from de-politicised, consensus-seeking oversight observed during the First Parliament. Oversight tools were not used optimally, focus areas of oversight not balanced and risks to effective oversight manifested over time. A declining political will to conduct oversight is of specific concern. Low levels of oversight became considerably amplified in the Fourth Parliament. The quality of oversight therefore showed contextual regression, bringing into question the standing of parliamentary oversight of the military.