Masters Degrees (Military History)

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Browsing Masters Degrees (Military History) by browse.metadata.advisor "Van der Waag, I. J."

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    A cold relationship: United States foreign policy towards South Africa, 1960 – 1990
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2016-12) Barnard, Tjaart; Liebenberg, J. C. R.; Van der Waag, I. J.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.
    ENGLISH SUMMARY: The diplomatic relations between the United States (USA) and South Africa (SA) had its birth in 1799 with the establishing of a consulate in Cape Town. Over the next two centuries the political dealings between the two countries were at times limited to almost merely acknowledgement of the other’s existence, while at other times there was very close cooperation on almost all levels of state. Diplomatic ties were strengthened during the Second World War, the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War when Americans and South Africans shared the same dugouts, flew in the same air missions, and opposed the same enemy on both the tactical as well as ideological fronts. During the Cold War, SA aligned itself with the Western world in the hope of being seen as staunchly anti-communist in order to fit in with the Cold War rhetoric of the West. Washington was delighted to have an ally in Southern Africa who would ensure, or so Washington hoped, that communism did not get a foothold in this strategically placed part of the globe. Unfortunately for the USA, South Africa’s apartheid policies went against everything that the USA proclaimed to stand for – freedom and democracy. The USA eventually found itself in a precarious position of having to choose between its own national interest and moral obligations. From 1960-1990 the USA-SA relationship oscillated as various personalities (presidents, politicians etc) and world events (e.g. Sharpeville massacre, Vietnam War, Watergate etc) impacted on it to various degrees. The USA-SA alliance consisted of political, economic and military relations (including nuclear weapons technology) which at times had to be clandestine in order for the USA to not lose its international prestige as leader of the free world. With SA however forging ahead with its policies of segregation and destabilisation the USA had to increasingly act under a cloak of plausible deniability in all spheres of its relationship with SA. The Soviet Union (USSR) and its allies (mainly Cuba) conducted military operations in Southern Africa and provided training to African liberation movements with the intention of helping them to achieve freedom from the apartheid regime or to protect themselves from Pretoria’s aggression, as was the case with Angola. Soviet support for the liberation movements in SA and the rest of Southern Africa was a mutual concern for both SA and the USA. Consequently the USA supported South African adventurism into its neighbouring countries under the auspices of preventing the communist forces from achieving world domination. By the end of the Cold War, the USA could no longer turn a blind eye to SA’s occupation of Namibia or the incursions into Angola. With assistance from the USA and other Western allies Pretoria was able to, in the greatest of secrecy and to the amazement of the world, built several nuclear weapons. SA’s nuclear programme never really reached a level where it could threaten the larger nuclear powers but it was troublesome enough to move the USA to action. By means of coercion and diplomatic pressure the USA managed to convince Pretoria to abandon its quest for a nuclear arsenal.
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    Fighting Springboks : C Company, Royal Natal carbineers : from Premier Mine to Po Valley, 1939 - 1945
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013-12) Bentz, Gustav; Van der Waag, I. J.; Liebenberg, Ian; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. Dept. of Military History.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Germany’s declaration of war on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the consequent war in Europe not only found the Union of South Africa politically divided but militarily unprepared to fight a modern war let alone make any worthwhile contribution toward its European allies’ war effort. The task of getting South Africa into the fight fell to newly appointed Prime Minister J.C. Smuts who cleverly outmanoeuvred J.B.M. Hertzog as leader of the nation. Not only was the Union Defence Force (UDF) severely ravaged by several budget cuts during and after the depression but it seemed to have no inclination of embracing the kind of mechanisation that was the hallmark of most European armies. Within the space of a year Smuts managed to transform the UDF and on 17 July 1940 the 1st South African Infantry Brigade set sail for East Africa where Mussolini’s Italians reigned supreme after brushing aside a couple of British border guards and laying claim to a few miles of British territory. One of the units dispatched by Smuts was the 1st Royal Natal Carbineers from Pietermaritzburg in Natal. Throughout the campaign the Regiment’s C Company fought with distinction but had the dubious honour of being the South African unit that suffered the most casualties during the whole campaign. Several of C Company’s men then become the vehicles through which the remainder of the war is experienced as the men were moved from one theatre of battle to another. Through their eyes the hunting trips into the East African bush and the death of their Commanding Officer, among other things, are relived. The victorious Springboks are then sent to Egypt where they were needed in an effort to break the deadlock that existed between the British 8th Army and the German Afrika Korps. Amidst the ebb and flow of the battle the men of C Company still found time to experience the sights and sounds of Africa’s most populous cities, Cairo and Alexandria. Here many young soldiers were exposed to pleasures and pastimes not to be had back in the Union. In spite of the eventual defeat of the German forces North Africa C Company witnessed the destruction of the 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh and suffered the loss of a combined platoon when Tobruk capitulated on 21 June 1942. After a brief period on home leave in 1943 C Company was back in action, this time in Italy as part of the 6th South African Armoured Division. Here they faced mountains, heavy snow and an enemy desperately fighting for every hill, stream and building. In the months which followed C Company were often in the midst of the action and many men lost close friends on the slopes of the Italian mountains. As final victory became apparent during the first months of 1945, C Company’s men began preparing for their post-war lives and when the first planes and ships left for the union at the end of April 1945 the men felt that they have served their country well and did their regiment proud.
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    Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk : two South African military disasters revisited 1941-1942
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014-12) Katz, David Brock; Van der Waag, I. J.; Visser, G. E.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory.