Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2)
Date
2003-01
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Juta Law
Abstract
INTRODUCTION TO 6: I have argued that the apartheid logic of separation and exclusivity was
structured in terms of the container metaphor. Racial and other identities and
physical spaces were thought to have clear boundaries, which separated white
from black, men from women and owners from non-owners. Legal concepts
and categories were thought to mirror reality. It was, for instance, believed that
race and gender referred to natural, immutable characteristics; that legal con-
cepts such as property and contract could be defined in terms of essential
attributes; that legal relationships were governed by scientific logic. This in-
duced normative closure. Normative distinctions (eg between white and black,
the public and private, the legislative and judicial functions, or ownership and
other real rights) were treated as absolute and impenetrable boundaries. Nor-
mative questions about the relation between different race groups or the dis-
tribution of land were reduced to technical questions about the best way to give
effect to pre-existing boundaries.
Regsdenke word in terme van metafore gestruktureer. Die metaforiese aard van regsdenke word egter dikwels deur regsgeleerdes negeer, wat nog vasklou aan die objektivistiese siening dat regsbegrippe met 'n objektiewe werklikheid ooreenstem. In dié artikel, ondersoek die skrywer 'n aantal metafore wat onderliggend was aan die apartheidsregsorde, sowel as sommige van die metafore wat gebruik word om die nuwe grondwetlike orde te beskryf. Die skrywer argumenteer dat die idee van regte as verhouding en / of dialoog, en die metafore van balansering en regte as straalvormige kategorieë veel meer kritiese en transformerende moontlikhede bied as die idee van regte / begrippe as houers. Die metafore wat gebruik word om die nuwe grondwetlike orde te beskryf, beklemtoon egter self sekere aspekte van ons ervaring ten koste van ander, en moet self voortdurend herinterpreteer en opnuut bedink word.
Regsdenke word in terme van metafore gestruktureer. Die metaforiese aard van regsdenke word egter dikwels deur regsgeleerdes negeer, wat nog vasklou aan die objektivistiese siening dat regsbegrippe met 'n objektiewe werklikheid ooreenstem. In dié artikel, ondersoek die skrywer 'n aantal metafore wat onderliggend was aan die apartheidsregsorde, sowel as sommige van die metafore wat gebruik word om die nuwe grondwetlike orde te beskryf. Die skrywer argumenteer dat die idee van regte as verhouding en / of dialoog, en die metafore van balansering en regte as straalvormige kategorieë veel meer kritiese en transformerende moontlikhede bied as die idee van regte / begrippe as houers. Die metafore wat gebruik word om die nuwe grondwetlike orde te beskryf, beklemtoon egter self sekere aspekte van ons ervaring ten koste van ander, en moet self voortdurend herinterpreteer en opnuut bedink word.
Description
CITATION: Botha, H. 2003. Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2). Journal of South African Law / Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2003(1):20-36.
The original publication is available at https://journals.co.za/content/journal/jlc_tsar
The original publication is available at https://journals.co.za/content/journal/jlc_tsar
Keywords
Constitution, Transformative constitutionalism, Constitutionalism, Apartheid logic, Individual rights
Citation
Botha, H. 2003. Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (part 2). Journal of South African Law / Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 2003(1):20-36.