Browsing by Author "Louw, Andre Mouton"

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    A critical evaluation of the interaction between sport and law in South Africa
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2010) Louw, Andre Mouton; Carnelley, M.(Marita), 1962-; Schembri, Christopher; Whitcher, Benita; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Law. Department of Mercantile Law.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation contains an evaluation of the interaction between law and sport in South Africa. The evaluation includes description of the main areas where laws (in the form of the common law, legislation and the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) apply to sport, in the contexts of both amateur sport and the fast-developing professional sports industry. Apart from such descriptive content, the dissertation will also critically evaluate the appropriateness of the relevant laws and their application in the often atypical context of sport, as well as the courts' treatment of the relevant legal issues. In the process of providing such critical evaluation, and where relevant, the author includes a comparative analysis of the treatment of relevant legal issues in other jurisdictions (most notably the United Kingdom and European Union, which are especially relevant in light of the application of the 'European model' of sports governance and regulation, which applies to the major sporting codes in South Africa). In particular, the author critically evaluates the following aspects of the South African jurisdiction's treatment of the application of law to sport: - The South African system of public regulation of sport by the State (and, specifically, the issue of the race-based transformation of sport, which involves an apparent government-driven agenda and is unique to the South African jurisdiction); - The courts' treatment to date of the susceptibility of the conduct of sports governing bodies to judicial scrutiny (and of the nature of such bodies as voluntary associations); - Various aspects related to the application of employment laws to the employment of professional athletes in team sports; - The application of common law remedies for breach of contract in the professional sports employment context; - The potential application of the restraint of trade doctrine (in, as the author suggests, an extended_ form) in the context of the freedom of movement of professional athletes; The apparently unsatisfactory state of current South African law in respect of legal protection against commercial misappropriation of aspects of the persona of famous athletes (i.e. in the context of 'image' -or-,'publicity' rights as recognized in certain other jurisdictions); and - An evaluation of the extensive protection (especially in the form of specific legislation in South Africa) against ambush marketing of major sporting events. The author includes some concluding observations regarding the state of South African sports law as compared to other jurisdictions, as well as some comment on expectations for the future development and potential importance of the South African domestic jurisdiction in the application of law to sport.
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    The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and other myths about the pursuit of equality, equity and dignity in post-apartheid South Africa) (Part 1)
    (2015) Louw, Andre Mouton
    The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) – SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes – probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionallycompliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivity in "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). This article forms Part 1 of this piece and the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. In Part 2 of this piece (which follows in this edition), the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnard case, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon.
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    The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (and other myths about the pursuit of equality, equity and dignity in post-apartheid South Africa) (Part 2)
    (2015) Louw, Andre Mouton
    The author critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act (or EEA), as well as the implications of the recent judgment by the Constitutional Court in its first case involving the application of affirmative action in the employment context (and in terms of the EEA) – SAPS v Solidarity obo Barnard. While reiterating the need for restitutionary measures such as affirmative action in South Africa, the author concludes – probably quite controversially - that the EEA's treatment of affirmative action has nothing to do with the equality right in the Bill of Rights, and that the Act pursues a different (and omnipresent) social engineering agenda by the state. The author calls for this realisation to prompt future affirmative action cases arising from the application of this Act to be removed from the scheme of (and potential defences available under) the equality jurisprudence, and for the courts to critically interrogate the constitutionality of the EEA's affirmative action scheme within its own context. The author believes that Chapter III of the Act is unconstitutional in this sense, and he calls for the scrapping of its provisions. He also calls for a (more) constitutionallycompliant exposition from the Constitutional Court of the parameters of legitimate affirmative action under the Bill of Rights, and adds his voice to the numerous calls for reconsideration of the "rationality test" expounded in Minister of Finance v van Heerden. More generally, the author considers the apparently all-pervasive application of the government ideology of the pursuit of demographic representivity in "transformation" of employment and other contexts (expressing grave doubts about its constitutionality along the way). In Part 1 of this piece (which precedes this article in this edition), the author considers the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. He then examines the affirmative action scheme of the Employment Equity Act, and explains his views on why such scheme is, in fact, unconstitutional. This article forms Part 2 of this piece and the author continues to critically evaluate the Constitutional Court judgment in the Barnard case, and he highlights the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment within the context of South Africa's equality jurisprudence. After a very brief consideration of the recent amendments to the Employment Equity Act, the author concludes by providing reasons why the Act's approach to affirmative action needs to be rejected, and soon.